HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
Before commenting on the court's decision, it is necessary to take note of the relevant subsections of s. 8 and 33 of the interim constitution. The latter is the general limitation clause, which applies to all the rights in the Bill of Rights (a similar clause is contained in s. 36 of the final constitution). 
Gender discrimination
The first decision in which the court was confronted with a possible violation of s. 8 was Brink v KitshofNO 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC). The question was whether s. 44(1) and (2) of the Insurance Act 1943 were in conflict with the equality clause. It deprived married women of all or some of the benefits of life insurance policies ceded to them or made in their favour by their husbands, in cases where their husband's estate was sequestrated. The Act contained no similar limitation upon the effect of a life insurance policy ceded or ellected in favour of a husband by a wife. According to the court it was clear that the discrimination in s. 44(1) and (2) was sex-related and therefore in violation of s. 8(2) of the interim constitution (para. 43).
Furthermore, this limitation could not be justified in terms of the limitation clause in s. 33(1) either (in the final constitution the limitation clause is contained in s. 36).
According to the court, the purpose of s. 44(1) and (2) was, inter alia, to protect the interests of creditors from possible collusion or fraud that could result from the close relationship between spouses. However, it was difficult to see how the distinction which was drawn between men and women which was the nub of the constitutional complaint can be reasonable or justifiable. No cogent reasons were provided as to why s. 44(1) and (2) apply only to transactions in which husbands effect policies in favour of or cede them to their wives, and not to similar transactions of wives in favour of their husbands. In other words, there is no reason why Iraud or collusion does not occur when husbands, rather than wives, are the beneficiaries of insurance policies. It was also not demonstrated by the respondent that there were no other legislative provisions which could reasonably serve the purpose of protecting the interests of creditors in a manner less invasive of constitutional rights (para. 48-49 
Unfairness to be proved
The court is correct in so far as it recognises that art. 8 reflects the special responsibility towards those groups subjected to discrimination in the past. It is for this reason that s. 8(4) creates a presumption of unfairness once discrimination on one of the specified grounds in s. the equality provision. In other words, all patterns of unequal treatment also those which are less severe than for example racial discrimination could amount to unfair discrimination and a subsequent * violation of the equality clause. The only difference is that where the discriminatory measures do not relate to one of the specified grounds in s. 8(2), the presumption of unfairness formulated in s. 8(4) does not apply.
It would thus be up to those claiming discrimination to prove its unfairness.
Paradoxically, the court acknowledges the generality of the equality clause. In the Brink case it stated that the list provided in s. 8(2) should not be used to derogate from the generality of the prohibition of discrimination. However when it comes to applying the right to equality to the case at hand, the court time and again limits its inquiry to whether those subjected to the discriminatory measures would qualify as historically 'disadvantaged' or 'vulnerable' and whether the discrimination would simultaneously result in a violation of human dignity comparable to that suffered by disadvantaged groups in the past. This became apparent in the decision of Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC), which was the second decision on equality and which illustrates the court's interpretation of the equality clause in much greater detail.
DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN DIGNITY
The Prinsloo case related to the Forest Control Act 1984, which has as one of its principal objectives the prevention and control of veld and forest fires. In order to achieve this it creates various fire control areas where schemes of compulsory fire control are 
Two-stage analysis
In order to establish whether there has been a contravention of s. 8(2), a two-stage analysis is required. Firstly, it has to be established whether the 'differentiation' would amount to 'discrimination'. This would be established if the differentiation resulted from one of the specified grounds. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend on whether the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.
The second stage of the analysis requires a decision on whether the discrimination would amount to 'unfair discrimination'. If it is found to have been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the o J complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. To determine whether the impact was unfair it is necessary to look, not only at the group who has been disadvantaged, but at the nature of the power in terms of which the discrimination was effected, and also at the nature of the interests which have been affected by the discrimination. If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair then there will be no violation of s. 8(2). If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause (s. 33 (1)). 
Differentiation v discrimination

In our view, unfair discrimination, when used in this second form in s. 8(2), in the context ofs. 8 as a whole, principally means treating persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal in dignity.'
Once again it must be emphasised that the court has a particular responsibility to sanction these grave forms of discrimination. However this may not imply that discriminatory measures which do not amount to a violation of human dignity, but are nonetheless unjustified and unproportional, may be discarded as 'unfair differentiation'. Unfortunately this is exactly the message that was conveyed in the Prinsloo decision. The court The court should have evaluated the impact of these differentiating measures (in particular the presumption of negligence) independently from the question as to whether their human dignity was violated. In other words, the latter question is superfluous as is the distinction between unfair differentiation and unfair discrimination. Once it wras established that s. 84 differentiates between people or categories of people, the court should have proceeded with the question whether this differentiation would be unfair, in the light of its ' o impact on the group in question (since these measures do not relate to one of the specified grounds, the unfairness cannot be presumed and must be proved). By first asking whether the discriminatory measures could impair the fundamental dignity of those affected, the court erected an additional, artificial and difficult barrier which effectively prevented it from dealing with the real issue at hand.
The same criticism applies to the subsequent decision of
Harksen v Lane NO. The court had to decide whether certain provisions of the Insolvency Act 1936 violated the equality clause.
According to s. 21 of the Act, the sequestration of the estate of one of the two spouses has the effect of vesting in the master or trustee, the property of the spouse (which includes a live-in partner for the purposes of the Act) whose estate has not been sequestrated. It was contended that the vesting provision constitutes unequal treatment of solvent spouses and discriminates unfairly against them. It imposes severe burdens on them beyond those applicable to other persons with whom the insolvent had dealings or close relationship, or whose property' is found in the possession of the insolvent.
Relying on the test developed in the Prinsloo decision, the court submitted that the differentiation does arise from the complainant's attributes or characteristics as solvent spouses, namely their close relationship with the insolvent spouse and the fact that they usually live together as a household. According to the court these attributes have the potential to demean persons in their human dignity. However it also submitted that the solvent spouses are not a vulnerable group which has suffered discrimination in the past (Harksen decision, para. 70). The majority of the court then concluded that the inconvenience and potential prejudice that could result for the solvent spouses from s. 21 do not lead to an impairment of fundamental dignity or constitute an impairment of a comparably serious nature (Harksen decision, para. 63).
It may well be that the fundamental dignity of the solvent spouses is not affected by the disputed provision; one might even question the court's assumption that the particular attributes of solvent spouses have the potential to demean their human dignity. Nonetheless, this does not explain whether it is justified that the spouse of the insolvent is treated differently from other people closely associated with the insolvent and with whom the latter could also collude at the expense of creditors.
The core issue thus remained unanswered.
TEACHERS AND EQUALITY
In the decision of Larbi-Odam v MECfor Education (North West Province), it was claimed successfully that a provincial regulation restricting foreign teachers with permanent residence permits for South Africa from applying for certain permanent teaching posts, violated the equality clause. The court identified the permanent residents as a vulnerable group, being a minority with little political muscle. Furthermore, the disputed governmental regulation was discriminatory, as it was based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair their fundamental dignity (para. 20). Since the impact of the regulations would be to cause great insecurity among people who have been granted the right to remain in the country permanently, and who are generally entitled to compete with South Africans in the employment market, the discrimination on the internet http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/judgements was also seen to be unfair. It could not be justified in terms of the limitation clause, since the aim of the provincial government to reduce unemployment among South African teachers at the expense of permanent residents would be illegitimate (Larbi-Odam decision, para. 31).
Although the outcome of the decision is to be welcomed, one might ask what the fate of the permanent residents would have been, had they not been perceived as a vulnerable group whose fundamental dignity might be at stake. Had they not passed this hurdle, the impact of the regulation on their interests and the idiosyncrasy of granting people permanent residency and then excluding them from the employment market, might not have been considered at all.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the main criticism against the historical interpretation followed by the court is that it results in a very restrictive concept of equality. Only those categories of persons who would qualify as a vulnerable group, or whose fundamental Hong Kong by Eugene Fung I n Re Finbo Engineering Co Ltd (unreported), 18 March 1998, Le Pichon J, the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong was asked whether legal set-off exists in Hong Kong. A petition was filed to wind up a company on the ground that it was unable to pay its debts and that it was just and equitable that it should be wound up. The petition was opposed by the company on the ground that it was entitled to a set-off against the debt owed to the petitioner.
If the company could show an arguable defence of legal set-off, the petition would have to be dismissed. Le Pichon J concluded that, given the complexity of the question, the company must at least have an arguable defence of legal set-off.
ORIGINS OF LEGAL SET-OFF
A 'set-off has been defined as 'the setting of cross-claims against each other to produce a balance' (see R Derham, Set-Off, 2nd ed, (1996) , Oxford, p. 1). Legal set-off has a statutory origin: the statutes of set-off were enacted in England in 1729 and 1735 ('the statutes of set-off). Before the passing of the statutes of set-off, a debtor had to bring a separate action in order to enforce a debt owed to him by his creditor.
The statutes of set-off were designed to prevent the imprisonment as a debtor of a person not truly indebted because there was a mutual debt owing by his creditor. The plea of set-off under the statutes was available where each of the demands sounded in damages and was 'capable of being liquidated, or ascertained with precision at the time of pleading'(Tindal CJ in Morley v Inglis (1837) 4 Bing (NC) 58 at p. 71). (Recently, in Stein v Blake [1996] 1 AC 243 at p. 251, Lord Hoffmann similarly said that the 'legal set-off is confined to debts which at the time when the defence of set-off is filed were due and payable and either liquidated or in sums capable of ascertainment without valuation or estimation.') Moreover, the debtor did not have to bring his cross-claim in a separate action. Thus, as Willes CJ thought, the statutes of set-off were intended to avoid circuit)' of action (Hutchinson v Sturges (1741) Willes 261 at p. 262).
The Supreme Court of Judicature in England was established by \hejudicature Act 1873, which expressly allowed the court to entertain a counterclaim (s. 24, rule 3). It therefore appears that the passing of the Judicature Act 1873 rendered the statutes of set-off redundant. Accordingly, the statues of set-off were repealed by s. 2 of Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879 and the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act 1883. In each of the repealing statutes, there were savings to ensure that the repeal would not affect any jurisdiction, principle or rule of law or equity which had been established or confirmed by or under either of the enactments (Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879, s. 4(1 )(b) and the preamble of the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act 1883). The saving provisions have been interpreted as preserving the right of set-off originally conferred by the statutes of set-off (e.g. Hanak v Green [1958] 2 QB 9 at p. 22 where Morris LJ said that 'the Judicature Acts conferred no new rights of set-off ). It follows that the right to a legal set-off under the statutes of set-off had come to be regarded as part of the common law of England and Wales at the time when the statutes of set-off were repealed. Although the 1884 Ordinance was subsequently amended several times, the application of the statutes of set-off was not
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